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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the “Sell in May” effect, which is related to the 
fact that financial markets seem to provide positively significant returns from November 
to April and not significant or negatively significant returns from May until October. The 
Sell in May effect is present in 30 out of 37 indexes, using a sample of 37 country indexes 
from 1970 to 2011. All sectors of activity are consistently affected by this seasonal 
pattern, being the effect stronger in production related sectors. The effect is largely felt in 
high market capitalization companies and less in companies with high dividend yield, 
being that there is not any clear pattern regarding Price-Earnings ratio. Furthermore, a 
strategy developed taken into account the “Sell in May” effect outperforms the 
benchmark, providing higher risk-adjusted returns for an investor 
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1. Introduction 
“Sell in May and go away…but remember to come back in September”. 
Anonymous Author 
 
“Sell in May and go away…” is an adage that is heard across all financial 
markets every year, consisting on the idea that investors should sell their equity 
portfolio in May, invest in the risk-free asset until October, month in which they 
should buy back their portfolio. Historically, in London, investors had as reference for 
returning to the markets the last horse race of the year, buying back at St. Leger’s day. 
In the U.S., the Halloween day was the chosen date to buy back the portfolio. As a 
result, investors can profit from the bull market that has historically taken place 
between November and April and avoid a bear market, usually present between May 
and October. 
The Sell in May effect is a puzzle first documented by Bouman and Jacobsen 
(2002) who find evidence of the presence of the effect in all markets in their sample. 
Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) show that the effect tends to happen not only in 
developed markets but in emerging markets as well. They also measure the economic 
significance of such findings by forming a simple portfolio and comparing two 
different strategies – a buy and hold strategy with a Halloween strategy, selling in the 
beginning of May and buying back on the 31st of October. Finally, they discover 
another puzzle related to the summer months, where returns are not significant or 
often negatively significant, adding magnitude to the Sell in May effect. 
Although already investigated by other authors, the Sell in May effect still 
needs clarifications, particularly concerning the ways it reflects in stocks as well as in 
market indexes and in sectors, other than in the U.S. market. Bouman and Jacobsen 
(2002) only focused on MSCI Country Indexes.  
The contribution of this paper is to show how this anomaly impacts equity 
markets in general, attempting to pursue a deeper approach on the subject by looking 
into the relation between the Sell in May effect and other relevant criteria: size, value 
and dividend yield.  
My analysis examines whether returns are positively significant between 
November and April and not significant or negatively significant in the other 6 
months of the year. The purpose of this paper will be to understand if the “Sell in May 
and go away” is just a simple adage or a self-fulfilling prophecy, which repeats itself 
year after year. 
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Firstly, I look at 5 regional indexes, in order to observe, in a global mapping, 
how this effect is spread all around the world. Then, I scrutinize a time-series of 37 
market indexes, from January 1970 to December 2011 to check if this effect is also 
present on the country level, when looking at market indexes. Thirdly, the 37 market 
indexes are divided in 10 sectors, according to Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GICS), to observe and understand if there are any cross-sectional 
differences. This will be an important step, as it will possibly provide an enlarged 
rationale for the anomaly. Furthermore, this paper studies the Sell in May effect by 
analysing the individual stocks of S&P500 and FTSE100 to grasp if, from an 
individual perspective, there is any erosion when you conduct the regressions stock by 
stock. Finally, I present an analysis of the relation between Sell in May Effect and 
some equity characteristics, namely size by looking at RUSSEL 3000 bottom and top 
500 stocks ranked on market capitalization from January 1974 to December 2011; 
value, by sorting S&P500 and EUROSTOXX50 in deciles according to Price-
Earnings ratio (P/E) and lastly by dividend yield (dy) through organizing these two 
indexes according to this criteria.  
The results, considering all datasets analysed are in favour of the existence and 
persistence of the Sell in May Effect and these are aligned with the results of previous 
studies on the anomaly, such as Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) and Jacobsen and 
Visaltanachoti (2010). Moreover, there is evidence that the effect is particularly 
strong in European markets and it is robust over time, with no evidence that the effect 
might be disappearing as other seasonal anomalies1. This goes against Murphy’s Law 
as described by Dimson and Marsh (1999). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the 
January effect is responsible for such significant returns and in fact there is evidence 
that the January effect has already lost its power across markets, with some 
exceptions. When looking at size, the effect is strongly felt in larger companies, 
meaning that investors with a portfolio integrating higher market capitalization 
companies are more likely to get an high return by selling in may and going away. 
Regarding dividend yield, it was observed that companies with higher dividend 
relative to the share price are far less related to the Sell in May effect. When looking 
at P/E, there is no clear trend or relation with the Sell in May effect.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See:	  
McLean,	  R.D.,	  Pontiff,	  J.,	  2012.	  Does	  academic	  research	  destroy	  stock	  return	  predictability?	  Working	  paper.	  Boston	  College	  
Fama,	  E.	  .	  1998.	  “Market	  Efficiency,	  Long-­‐Term	  Returns,	  and	  Behavioral	  Finance,”	  J.	  Financ.	  Econ.,	  49,pp.	  283-­‐306.	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In the final part of the paper, a portfolio formed by companies in which the 
Sell in May effect is most seen was constructed so the common investor can profit 
from the effect in equity markets. This analysis was performed using one of the 
world’s largest financial markets, the S&P500, which should be in theory, one of the 
most efficient ones globally.  
Although it is assumed that the bull market starts in the month of November, a 
robustness check was performed to better understand when in fact this event happens 
more significantly. There is evidence that these six months comprised by the period of 
November to April are the ones, which always provide considerably higher returns 
and hence where the bull market seems to take place. 
Several seasonal anomalies have already been documented2, such as the 
Monday effect, the Friday effect or the January effect. However, there are two main 
differences between such effects and the Sell in May. Firstly, the first ones fail on 
being consistent over the time, as they seem to disappear or reverse itself after its 
discovery. With the Sell in May effect, although early documented by O’Higgins and 
Downes (1990) and later by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), the effect seems to persist. 
Secondly, the first anomalies addressed, although providing high absolute positive 
returns, turn out not to be feasible when incorporating transaction costs due to a large 
number of mandatory transactions, whereas the Sell in May effect only has to take 
into account major transaction costs twice a year, when buying and selling the stocks, 
which do not erode the returns over time.  
The analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review on the 
existent literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used. Section 4 
contains the empirical results. Section 5 compares the Sell in May strategy to a buy-
and-hold strategy. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the conclusions. 
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  See	  :	  
French.	  	  K.,	  	  1980.	  	  Stock	  	  returns	  	  and	  	  the	  	  weekend	  	  effect,	  	  Journal	  	  of	  	  Financial	  	  Economics	  	  8,	  	  59-­‐69;	  
Gibbons,	  	  M.	  	  and	  	  P.	  	  Hess,	  1981,	  	  Day	  	  of	  	  the	  	  week	  	  effects	  	  and	  	  asset	  	  returns.	  	  Journal	  	  of	  	  Business	  	  54,	  579-­‐596.;	  
Thaler,	  R.	  H.	  1987.	  Anomalies:	  the	  January	  effect.	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives,	  1(1),197-­‐201.	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2. Literature review 
October: This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. The others are 
July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August and 
February. 
Mark Twain 
 
The Sell in May adage goes back to the 17th century and was first described 
by O’Higgins and Downes (1990). O’ Higgins and Downes were two top asset 
managers from Wall Street that report a similar strategy taking into account the 
market timing issues stating that “it would have you in the stock market starting 
October 31 and through April 30 and out of the market for the half of the year”.  
Still, they do not formally test the economic significance of their results.  
Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) extend the Sell in May adage by studying what 
they name the Halloween Indicator, by dividing the financial year between Summer 
months (May to October) and Winter months (November to April), being that an 
investor should time the market and hold a portfolio of stocks during the winter 
months, sell it in May and invest in the money market for the summer period. They 
find the existence of the effect in 36 out of the 37 MSCI country indexes for the 
period from 1970 through 1998. They also look for a strategy, which provides a high-
risk adjusted return when compared to the benchmark. As explanations, Bouman and 
Jacobsen rule out data mining, the January effect, changes in interest rates, concluding 
that the effect is, in part, linked with vacations.  
Focusing on seasonal anomalies, cloudy days are associated with a lower 
aggregate stock return in New York City as presented by Saunders (1993) and more 
recently by Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), who analyse 26 countries, from 1982 to 
1997, showing that sunshine is strongly correlated with equity returns. However, as 
these weather-based strategies involve frequent trading, the transaction costs 
eliminate the gains.  
Keim and Stambaugh (1984) also investigate a seasonal anomaly, the weekend 
effect in stock returns, showing that there are consistently negative Monday returns 
for the S&P Composite, traded stocks of firms of all sizes and over-the-counter 
(OTC) stocks over a period going back to 1928.  
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003) describe a pattern in stock returns, which is 
analogous to the Sell in May effect, denominated as Seasonal Affective Disorder 
(SAD), meaning that there is a relation between length of the days and stock returns.  
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The idea is again a link between stock returns and seasonality. The authors relate 
decreasing hours of daylight with the degree of risk aversion. Less hours of daylight 
lead to a greater degree of risk aversion and thus to a gradual increase in stock returns 
when winter months start as days begin to be longer. 
Cao and Wei (2005) examine an alternative seasonal pattern in stock returns. 
They relate temperatures with equity returns and relate different states of mind that 
investors may present with different temperatures. Low temperatures are related to 
aggressive risk taking, whereas high temperatures can be linked either with apathy or 
aggression. They find that, with higher temperatures, the apathy mood seem to 
dominate aggression, leading to lower stock returns and that with lower temperatures, 
higher stock returns should be expected. They conclude that stock returns are 
significantly negatively related to temperature, and again are faced with a Summer-
Winter dichotomy in equity returns.  
Hong and Yu (2009) state that investors have “gone fishing”, and that both 
trading activity and stock returns are lower during the summer months. Looking at 
July, August and September for a sample of 51 stock markets, the authors find that 
equity returns are lower in the summer months than in the remainder of the year. They 
find that this effect is particularly stronger as you move farther away from the 
equator. Although pursuing a different rationale from Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), 
the results are aligned as they both find vacations to be related to this seasonal 
anomaly.  
Jacobsen and Visaltanachoti (2010) conduct a study on U.S. sectors, and find 
that 48 out of 49 industries perform better during winter than summer, looking at 
equity returns from 1926-2006. Returns are statistically significant in more than two 
thirds of their sample and there exist large differences across sectors and industries.   
Jacobsen and Visaltanachoti (2010) determine that the effect is very strong in the 
production sectors and almost absent when looking at consumer consumption sectors. 
Although shedding some extra light on the matter of the “Sell in May” effect, it still 
remains a puzzle as neither liquidity or other well-known risk factors appear to have 
any explanatory power.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
Rule No.1: Never lose Money. Rule No. 2:Never forget rule No.1 
Warren Buffett 
 
3.1. Data 
In order to better find the answer to the problem described, I am using 8 
datasets that are representative of financial markets from all around the world. A 
summary of the datasets used is presented in Table 1, followed by a more detailed 
description.  
Table 1 
- Datasets - 
 # 
 
Dataset and source N Time period 
1  
MSCI Regional Indexes 
Source: MSCI 8 01/1970-12/2011 
2  
Country Indexes  
Source: Bloomberg 37 01/1970-12/2011 
3  
Country Indexes sorted on 10 sectors 
Source: Bloomberg 37x10 01/1970-12/2011 
4  
Russell 2000 and Russell 1000 sorted in size deciles 
Source: Bloomberg 3000 01/1974-12/2011 
5  
S&P500 constituent stocks sorted on Dy and P/E 
Source: Bloomberg 500 01/1974-12/2011 
6  
Eurostoxx50 constituent stocks sorted on Dy and P/E  
Source: Bloomberg 50 01/1977-12/2011 
7  
Constituent stocks of SP500 
Source: Bloomberg 500 01/1970-12/2011 
8  
Constituent stocks of FTSE100  
Source: Bloomberg 100 01/1970-12/2011 
 
The first dataset is comprised of USD denominated continuously compounded 
monthly returns on eight MSCI regional indexes from January 1970 to December 
2011 and serves the purpose of understanding if the effect is spread worldwide and if 
there are exceptions. The eight regional indexes are the World Standard (Large + Mid 
Cap) plus the five main regions that compose the world: Europe, North America, 
Latin America, Asia Pacific and Middle East&Africa; plus the G7 index and the 
Emergent Market index. The second set of data is constituted by USD continuously 
compounded monthly returns on the most significant equity index of each of the 37 
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countries chosen worldwide3. The data length varies a lot from index to index, being 
the end period of December 2011 common to all.  
The third dataset is composed by the 37 country indexes grouped according to 
the 10 sectors GICS definition: Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, 
Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, 
Telecommunications Services and Utilities. 
The fourth dataset integrates USD continuously compounded returns on the 
Russel3000 index. This dataset entails the bottom and upper 500 stocks sorted into 
market capitalization deciles with the purpose of testing for size patterns in the Sell in 
May effect. 
The fifth and the sixth datasets are formed by the S&P500 and 
EUROSTOXX50 indexes sorted on P/E and dividend yield. 
The final two datasets comprise the constituent stocks of two of the largest 
equity indexes in the world, in order to understand the impact of the Sell in May 
effect on a stock-by-stock level.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
The econometric methodology used in order to test the presence of the “Sell in 
May” effect throughout the datasets presented before is a simple regression technique 
that incorporates a dummy variable to discriminate the two periods under analysis. 
The equation is as follows (Bouman and Jacobsen, (2002)): 
                                                r! =   µμ+   α!  S! +   ε!  ,                                                        (1) 
,where µ is the constant in the regression and St is the dummy variable, which will 
assume the value of one if month t is between November and April, and the value 
zero from May to October. The null hypothesis in this test is whether α1 is different 
from zero. The conclusion to take is the following: if α1 is positive and significant this 
rejects the null hypothesis of no “Sell in May” effect. It is a very simple approach, 
leading to robust conclusions while easy to analyse and allows adding more variables 
as well. Bearing in mind the reasoning behind this simple approach, allied to the fact 
that one of the criticisms regarding the Sell in May effect is that the January effect 
may be responsible for the Sell in May anomaly, a new equation was introduced, now 
taking into account the January effect. This will clarify if an investor still gets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  A	  complete	  list	  of	  the	  countries	  and	  the	  corresponding	  indexes	  its	  provided	  in	  Appendix	  I.	  	  
“Sell in May and Go Away”: Adage or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  
significant positive returns in the “Sell in May” effect dummy (now excluding 
January) or if the January effect is in fact explaining all the return different from zero.  
The regression equation is as it follows (Bouman and Jacobsen, (2002)): 
                                              r! =   µμ+   α!  S!!"# + α!Jan! +   ε!,    (2) 
,where Jant is also a dummy variable, which will take the value of one if returns are in 
January and zero in the other months. St is adjusted in order to not include January, 
which will now have a value of zero. It is important to stress that the equation is based 
on the fact that all returns in January are due to January effect and, as expected, this 
strong attention will understate “Sell in May” effect and amplify the January effect. 
Nevertheless, it represents a test on the robustness and significance of the effect, 
being important to analyse if we are tackling a different anomaly than the well-known 
January effect. 
 
 
4. Results 
You only need to make one big score in finance to be a hero forever. 
Merton Miller 
 
Section 4 provides the main empirical results and is divided in eight parts. The 
results will be presented firstly on a broad manner by looking at regional indexes and 
then going for a more detailed analysis, ending on a stock-by-sock level analysis of 
the Sell in May effect. 
In first place, results on regional division are presented. Then, are presented 
the results on the analysis of 37 country indexes. These are followed by the results on 
the sectorial analysis of the previously referred 37 market indexes, according to GICS 
10 sector definition.  The next set of results presents the relation between the Sell in 
May and size, value, dividend yield criteria. The final part of the results sections 
addresses the stock-by-stock analysis results.  
 
 
4.1. Results on regional division 
As a first step to assess the Sell in May effect from a broad perspective, table 2 
follows the effect throughout the world in order to identify whether the Sell in May 
effect is present worldwide. The results are summarized as follows: 
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Considering the MSCI World Index, the Sell in May effect is positively 
significant in both equations and provides a positively significant Sharpe Ratio in the 
November-April period and a negatively significant Sharpe Ratio in the remainder of 
the year.  
When looking at the world, firstly sorted in 5 regions, only Europe, North 
America and Latin America present a clear existence of the Sell in May effect. In line 
with the findings of Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), Europe is where the effect 
predominates the most and in the region of Middle East & Africa the effect is almost 
absent.  
Finally, when contrasting two interesting, somewhat dichotomist groups, G7 
and Emerging Markets, it is possible to observe that both developed and developing 
markets exhibit the Sell in May effect, with the returns in November-April seem to be 
superior to those in May-October. Regarding the Sharpe Ratio, these are positively 
significant for the bullish period and not significant in the bearish period.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
- Summary Results for MSCI Regional Indexes - 
MSCI Indexes N α 1 αtAdj α2 Sharpe Ratio (November-April) 
Sharpe Ratio 
(May-October) 
World 504 1.20*** 1.29*** 0.79 0.16** -0.12* 
  [3.10] [3.16] [1.09] [2.55] [-1.91] Europe 504 1.60*** 1.77*** 0.77 0.18*** -0.14** 
  [3.53] [3.72] [0.91] [2.90] [-2.17] North America 504 0.97** 0.97** 0.97 0.14** -0.09 
  [2.42] [2.30] [1.29] [2.13] [-1.38] Latin America 288 2.43** 2.70** 1.10 0.25*** -0.03 
  [2.23] [2.35] [0.54] [2.91] [-0.36] Asia Pacific 288 0.87 1.13 -0.44 0.03 -0.11 
  [1.23] [1.52] [-0.33] [0.37] [-1.32] ME&A 108 0.59 1.41 -3.50 0.16 0.05 
  [0.47] [1.08] [1.51] [1.17] [0.36] G7 420 1.05** 1.23*** 0.17 0.17** -0.09 
  [2.50] [2.79] [0.21] [2.38] [-1.27] Emerg. Markets 288 2.25*** 2.45*** 1.29 0.26*** -0.09 
  [2.71] [2.80] [0.83] [3.02] [-1.02] Notes: The t-values for the α1, α1Adj and α2, which are the parameters of the regressions that capture the Sell and May effect, 
adjusted and non-adjusted for the January effect are presented in brackets. Monthly Sharpe ratios were calculated using U.S. three 
month T-bill and their respective t-values for both the period of November-April and May-October are calculated as proposed by Lo 
(2002). * 10% significance; ** 5% significance; 1% significance. 
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4.2.  Results on market indexes  
In order to further answer the question if the Sell in the May effect is present 
in all stock markets and taking the second step in the funnel approach, it is crucial 
now to look at market indexes. This analysis is performed with 37 Country Indexes, 
as described in the data section. The conclusions are summarized in Table 3.  
Looking at α1 from equation (1) described in the methodology, it is possible to 
observe that 30 out of 37 indexes present superior average returns in the period of 
November-April when comparing to the period May-October. The strength of the 
effect varies across countries. Again, Europe is where the Sell in May effect becomes 
more evident as all countries analysed present significance. It is noteworthy to see 
that Nikkei in Japan and Taiwan Stock Exchange also present high significance to the 
Sell in May effect, going against the fact that Asia Pacific Region, as a whole, doesn’t 
reflect this effect.  
Incorporating the January effect as a separate anomaly the Sell in May effect 
remains significant, although for some countries the month of January reflects a 
tremendous importance in the winter months, being that now 26 out of 37 country 
indexes present significance. These results are not presented in Table 3 in order to 
save space.  
When looking at the Sharpe Ratios in Table 3, the Sell in May effect becomes 
clearer, as 32 out of 37 countries under analysis present positively significant Sharpe 
ratios for the November-April period and 12 out of 37 countries exhibit negatively 
significant SR for the remainder of the year, being that the other indexes, with the 
exception of 4, are not significant. Table 4 shows average SR for the two periods 
under analysis. 
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Table 3 
- Summary Results on Market Indexes - 
Region Market Indexes Number of Observations α1 
Sharpe Ratio 
(November-April) 
Sharpe Ratio 
(May-October) 
Asia-
Pacific 
S&P/ASX200 235 0.77* 0.14* -0.07 
HK Hang Seng 503 0.62 0.08* 0.04 
Jakarta SE 344 2.30*** 0.22*** -0.04 
NIKKEI225 503 1.53*** 0.11** -0.13*** 
Korea SE 383 1.60*** 0.14** -0.04 
FTSE Malaysia 216 1.61** 0.08 -0.14* 
New Zealand SE 131 0.58 0.16* -0.03 
Philippines SE 299 1.38* 0.14** -0.02 
Singapore ST 148 0.85 0.07 -0.08 
Taiwan SE 503 3.16*** 0.22*** -0.10* 
Thailand SE 293 1.53* 0.11 -0.06 
Europe 
Vienna SE 234 2.19*** 0.24*** -0.17** 
BEL20 252 1.58*** 0.17** -0.14* 
OMX Copenhagen 192 1.18* 0.20** -0.04 
OMX Helsinki 25 283 2.42*** 0.18*** -0.15** 
CAC40 293 1.98*** 0.17*** -0.16** 
DAX 503 1.50*** 0.14*** -0.09* 
Athens SE 299 1.57* 0.11* -0.04 
Irish SE 347 2.28*** 0.25*** -0.11** 
FTSEMIB 168 2.55**** 0.12 -0.28*** 
AEX 347 1.88*** 0.21*** -0.10* 
Oslo SE OBX 191 1.96** 0.26*** -0.05 
PSI20 228 1.69*** 0.16** -0.13* 
MICEX 171 5.43*** 0.34*** -0.10 
IBEX 299 1.50*** 0.15** -0.08 
OMX Stocholm 30 300 2.08*** 0.22*** -0.09 
Swiss MI 281 0.87* 0.14** -0.04 
Istanbul SE 100 287 2.28* 0.24*** 0.13* 
FTSE100 335 1.23*** 0.19*** -0.07 
Middle 
East & 
Africa 
Amman SE 144 0.39 0.09 0.00 
FTSE/JSE Africa 198 1.25* 0.26*** 0.01 
North-
America 
S&P/TSX 503 1.19*** 0.14*** -0.07 
S&P500 503 0.93*** 0.13*** -0.04 
Mexican SE 215 1.21 0.21*** 0.05 
Latin 
America 
Buenos Aires SE 287 1.06 0.22*** 0.14** 
BOVESPA 264 4.16** 0.41*** 0.20*** 
Santiago SE 263 0.39 0.20*** 0.15** 
Notes:  *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% significant. The table presents Monthly Sharpe Ratios (Lo 
(2002)), which were calculated using U.S. 3 month T-bill. T-statistics are not presented for space reasons.  
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Table 4 
- Average Sharpe Ratio - 
  November to April  May to October 
Average SR  0.19*** 0.02 
Naive t-stat [5.15] [-0.13] 
                                      Notes: *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% significant. Both  
      SR and t-stats were calculated through a simple average.  
 
On average, from November to April, the Sharpe Ratio is positively 
significant, whereas for the remainder of the year it is either not significant or 
negatively significant, being the exception the month of July, which produces a 
positively significant Sharpe of 0.10. This figure is not visible in Table 4, as the 
values presented constitute the average of the two dichotomist periods.  
The Sell in May is present all over the world equity market indexes, being the 
European countries the ones who produce the more robust conclusions as all 
European countries analysed were significant to the Sell in May effect.  
 
4.3. Results on sectors  
Answering the question if the Sell in May effect is present in all sectors of 
activity, the approach was to divide each of the 37 market indexes in 10 different 
sectors, according to the Global Industry Classification Standards: Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Industrials, Materials, Health Care, 
Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunications Services and Utilities. 
Table 5 presents the percentage of countries where the Sell in May effect is 
significant.in each sector. For instance, 59% of the countries in the sample show a 
significant Sell in May effect in the Consumer Discretionary sector. 
Considering all 37 indexes, looking at α1 and α1Adj, it is possible to observe 
that 6 out of 10 sectors are statistically significant in more than half of the countries 
analysed, as they are over 50%. The most significant sectors in which the Sell in May 
effect is present are Industrial and Materials. This result is in line with Jacobsen and 
Visaltanachoti (2010), who find that production sectors have a stronger significance. 
Energy, Utilities and Health Care are the sectors with lower percentage of 
significance when considering the 37 indexes.  
Looking at Panel 2, one can observe the results of the sectorial analysis sorted 
between 5 regions of the world. Again, the region which presents a stronger Sell in 
May effect is Europe with greater percentage overall, being that it is particularly 
stronger in the production-related sectors and weaker in energy, health care and 
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utilities.  The same trends apply to Asia Pacific region, although with lower strength. 
The other three regions, as are formed by fewer countries, it becomes less observable 
on how sectors are impacted by the Sell in May effect. Nevertheless it can be stated 
that the effect is present not only in all regions, country indexes but also across all 
sectors of activity, with the production sectors showing the stronger results.  
 
Table 5 
- Summary Results on Market Indexes sorted on Sectors - 
  Panel 1 - 37 Indexes   Panel 2 - αt Regional  
GICS SECTORS αt αtAdj   Asia Pacific Europe LATAM ME&A North America 
Consumer Discretionary  59% 56%   45% 59% 100% 50% 100% 
Consumer Staples 51% 54%   45% 61% 0% 0% 67% 
Energy 36% 36%   9% 44% 50% 50% 100% 
Financials 58% 56%   36% 78% 0% 50% 67% 
Health Care 27% 23%   14% 31% 0% 50% 33% 
Industrials 71% 66%   64% 71% 100% 50% 100% 
Information Technology 54% 50%   63% 46% 100% 0% 100% 
Materials 74% 74%   60% 88% 0% 50% 100% 
Telecommunications 39% 39%   30% 38% 0% 100% 67% 
Utilities 32% 32%   38% 33% 0% 100% 0% 
Notes: The table presents the percentage of countries that are significant to the Sell in May Effect in each sector.  Some country indexes 
do not integrate all sectors of activity and so the percentage is calculated through dividing the number of significant countries in each 
sector, over the number of countries that integrate the sector in question. Significance is given at a 90% confidence level.  
 
 
4.4. Results on deciles formed on size  
In order to answer the question if the Sell in May effect varies with market 
capitalization of companies, that is, if size plays a role in explaining the Sell in May 
phenomena, I grouped the Russell 3000 bottom and upper 500 stocks into deciles 
according to market capitalization. The results are summarized in Table 6.  
Firstly, by looking at α1, the parameter that captures the Sell in May effect in 
equation (1), it is possible to note that 6 out of 10 deciles are significant for the lower 
market capitalization companies and 8 out of 10 deciles for the higher market 
capitalization companies, which may be a signal that higher market capitalization 
companies are more subjected to the Sell in May effect, although both presenting high 
percentage of significance. When incorporating the January effect, according to 
equation (2), the number of significant deciles goes down to 50% of significant 
deciles for the lower market capitalization companies, whereas for the top market 
capitalization companies, the number goes to 90%. Regarding Sharpe Ratio, it 
becomes clearer, as for the lower market capitalization, for the period of November-
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April (the bullish period), all deciles present an insignificant Sharpe Ratio and for the 
period of May-October (bearish period) 8 out of 10 deciles are negatively significant. 
For the higher market capitalization companies, in the period of November-April all 
deciles present a positively significant Sharpe, being that for the bearish period all 
deciles are not significant.  
 
Table 6 
- Summary Results on Russel 3000 sorted in size deciles - 
  Panel 1 - Russel 3000 Lower Mkt. Cap    Panel 2 - Russel 3000 Higher Mkt. Cap  
Deciles αt α1Adj 
SR  
(Nov-Apr) 
SR 
(May-Oct)   
α1 α1Adj 
SR  
(Nov-Apr) 
SR 
(May-Oct) 
Low Decile 2.05** 4.46* 0.03 -0.21***   1.55** 1.62** 0.16** -0.06 
  [2.33] [1.71] [0.38] [-2.81]   [2.46] [2.46] [2.14] [-0.79] 
2nd decile 2.61*** 4.87** 0.05 -0.27***   1.56** 1.56** 0.22*** -0.03 
  [2.94] [2.33] [0.61] [-3.47]   [2.38] [2.27] [2.73] [-0.36] 
3rd decile 1.60** 3.19* 0.05 -0.19**   1.43*** 1.53*** 0.31*** -0.02 
  [2.30] [1.78] [0.65] [-2.45]   [2.74] [2.80] [3.78] [-0.19] 
4th decile 1.49 2.72 -0.00 -0.13*   0.84 0.93 0.17** 0.02 
  [1.30] [1.04] [-0.04] [-1.79]   [1.54] [1.63] [2.05] [0.24] 
5th decile 0.61 4.15 -0.01 -0.07   0.96* 1.13* 0.24*** 0.06 
  [0.61] [-0.07] [-0.06] [-0.92]   [1.70] [1.91] [2.99] [-0.77] 
6th decile 2.01** 3.87* 0.09 -0.19**   1.21** 1.31** 0.29*** -0.004 
  [2.44] [1.90] [1.12] [-2.46]   [2.41] [2.49] [3.49] [-0.05] 
7th decile 0.66 2.95 -0.04 -0.13*   0.92 1.01* 0.21*** 0.02 
  [0.87] [0.26] [-0.58] [-1.78]   [1.48] [1.74] [2.64] [0.02] 
8th decile 1.79** 3.26** 0.07 -0.18**   1.02** 1.19** 0.24*** 0.002 
  [2.51] [2.01] [0.91] [-2.52]   [2.06] [2.29] [2.90] [0.02] 
9th decile 1.57* 4.23 -0.00 -0.19**   1.07** 1.18** 0.33*** 0.04 
  [1.81] [1.16] [-0.03] [-2.46]   [2.13] [2.23] [4.04] [0.49] 
High decile 0.93 2.99 0.03 -0.11   0.85* 0.87* 0.33*** 0.03 
  [1.32] [0.72] [0.35] [-1.49]   [1.91] [1.88] [3.65] [0.42] 
Notes: The t-values for the α1, α1Adj and α2, which are the parameters of the regressions that capture the Sell and May 
effect, adjusted and non-adjusted for the January effect are presented in brackets. Monthly Sharpe ratios were calculated 
using U.S. three month T-bill and their respective t-values for both the period of November-April and May-October are 
calculated as proposed by Lo (2002). * 10% significance; ** 5% significance; 1% significance. 
 
It is possible to conclude that there is a stronger presence of the Sell in May 
effect when looking at the higher market capitalization stocks, though the effect is 
wide and present across all ranges of market capitalization. Moreover, I also found 
that the strength of the January effect is higher when observing lower market 
capitalization deciles and it is almost absent when considering higher market 
capitalization stocks. The results on the January effect are not included in order to 
save space.  
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4.5. Results on deciles formed on Dividend Yield ratio and Price-Earnings ratio 
 In order to answer the question if the Sell in May effect is related with any 
other criteria and to shed light on the puzzle, I sorted both S&P500 and Eurostoxx50 
into d/y and P/E deciles. The results for P/E deciles and for d/y are shown in Tables 7 
and 8, respectively. 
Table 7 
- Summary Results on Price-Earnings deciles - 
  Panel 1 - S&P500   Panel 2 - Eurostoxx50 
Deciles αt SR  (Nov-Apr) 
SR 
(May-Oct)   
αt        SR (Nov-Apr) 
 SR 
(May-Oct) 
Low decile 1.62*** 0.22*** -0.07   1.86* 0.13 -0.17* 
  [2.61] [3.02] [-0.95]   [1.72] [1.14] [-1.76] 
2nd decile 1.32** 0.20*** -0.07   -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 
  [2.43] [2.68] [-0.96]   [-0.07] [-0.53] [-0.85] 
3rd decile 1.24** 0.23*** -0.05   3.06*** 0.30*** -0.20** 
  [2.38] [3.08] [-0.65]   [2.94] [3.10] [-2.06] 
4th decile 1.31** 0.25*** -0.05   2.80** 0.09 -0.25*** 
  [2.55] [3.43] [-0.63]   [2.36] [1.01] [-2.58] 
5th decile 0.85* 0.23*** 0.00   3.94*** 0.23** -0.30*** 
  [1.92] [3.14] [-0.06]   [3.64] [2.44] [-3.99] 
6th decile 1.00** 0.25*** 0.00   3.34*** 0.22*** -0.17** 
  [2.15] [3.37] [-0.04]   [2.96] [2.59] [-1.99] 
7th decile 1.32** 0.17** -0.06   2.15** 0.08 -0.26*** 
  [2.21] [2.55] [0.84]   [2.28] [0.89] [-2.74] 
8th decile 1.41** 0.29*** 0.00   2.81*** 0.14* -0.20*** 
  [2.48] [3.94] [-0.04]   [3.09] [1.90] [-2.72] 
9th decile 0.92 0.21*** 0.01   2.41** 0.13 -0.17* 
  [1.62] [2.93] [0.20]   [2.00] [1.36] [-1.78] 
High decile 1.54** 0.21*** -0.05   2.77*** 0.14 -0.27*** 
  [2.35] [2.82] [-0.70]   [2.90] [1.65] [-3.08] 
Notes: The t-values for the α1 are presented in brackets. Monthly Sharpe ratios were calculated 
using U.S. three month T-bill and their respective t-values for both the period of November-April 
and May-October are calculated as proposed by Lo (2002). *10% significant; **5% significant; 
***1% significant. 
Regarding Price-Earnings ratio, based on the sample it does not seem to exist 
any transparent relation between the Sell in May effect and the P/E ratio. 
Incorporating the January effect does not add knowledge on this relation, as this effect 
is absent from the sample analysed. The results on the January effect are not presented 
in order to save space. The value factor does not add any further knowledge on the 
Sell in May puzzle.  
Considering dividend yield, observing exclusively αt it is difficult to grasp a 
conclusion on the Sell in May effect and companies’ dividend. Firstly for the 
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S&P500, the first five deciles present significant αt, whereas only 2 out of 5 deciles 
with higher dividend yield present significance, being this a first signal that higher 
dividend paying companies are less related with the Sell in May effect. Looking at 
Eurostoxx50, this is not as clear when looking at the significance of αt, as only the 9th 
decile is non-significant.  
 
Table 8 
- Summary Results on Dividend Yield deciles - 
  Panel 1 - S&P500   Panel 2 - Eurostoxx50 
Deciles αt SR  (Nov-Apr) 
SR 
(May-Oct)   αt 
SR  
(Nov-Apr) 
SR 
(May-Oct) 
Low Decile 1.94*** 0.23*** -0.07   2.59*** 0.21** -0.19** 
  [2.72] [3.16] [-0.97]   [2.61] [2.41] [-2.17] 
2nd decile 1.93*** 0.28*** -0.05   2.84** 0.19** -0.16* 
  [2.94] [3.80] [-0.65]   [2.54] [2.18] [-1.89] 
3rd decile 1.49*** 0.27*** -0.04   2.59*** 0.11 -0.17** 
  [2.66] [3.67] [-0.60]   [2.58] [1.54] [-2.38] 
4th decile 2.20*** 0.25*** -0.09   2.61*** 0.12 -0.26*** 
  [3.42] [3.72] [-1.32]   [2.72] [1.23] [-2.70] 
5th decile 1.89*** 0.23*** -0.10   4.06*** 0.26*** -0.28*** 
  [3.45] [3.58] [-1.55]   [3.52] [2.76] [-2.89] 
6th decile 0.71 0.11* 0.02   1.87* 0.06 -0.18** 
  [0.97] [1.72] [0.34]   [1.84] [0.67] [-2.06] 
7th decile 1.34*** 0.16** -0.09   2.82*** 0.19** -0.20** 
  [2.60] [2.54] [-1.34]   [3.06] [2.14] [-2.24] 
8th decile 1.18** 0.23*** -0.04   2.79** 0.13 -0.24** 
  [2.39] [3.08] [-0.61]   [2.52] [1.37] [-2.50] 
9th decile 0.68 0.16** -0.01   0.80 0.00 -0.13 
  [1.62] [2.37] [-0.08]   [0.74] [0.00] [-1.41] 
High decile 0.50 0.10 -0.03   2.24** 0.14 -0.18* 
  [1.23] [1.48] [-0.40]   [2.03] [1.48] [-1.91] 
Notes: The t-values for the α1 are presented in brackets. Monthly Sharpe ratios were calculated using 
U.S. three month T-bill and their respective t-values for both the period of November-April and 
May-October are calculated as proposed by Lo (2002). *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% 
significant. 
 
However, this trend can be confirmed by looking at the Sharpe Ratio. In 
higher d/y companies, for Eurostoxx50 only 1 out of 5 deciles present a significant 
Sharpe in the November-April period. 
Wrapping up, the conclusions lead to the fact that earnings growth expectation 
measured through Price-Earnings ratio does not add any explicatory power to the Sell 
in May puzzle. Conversely, the Dividend yield seems to add explanatory muscles, as 
the companies with higher dividend yield, present in the sample, are less subjected to 
the Sell in May effect. 
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4.7 Results on individual stocks  
Even if empirical evidence has shown that the principal American index is not 
one of the countries with the strongest “Sell in May” effect, it is not possible to forget 
the fact that most of the academics, investors and financial institutions see it as a 
symbol of the best proxy for the efficient market and thus it is assumed a better 
market to be tested. A summary of the results is reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
- Summary Results for the S&P500 - 
Index Number of Stocks 
"Sell in May” 
effect 
α1 only stat. 
significant 
α1 + αjan stat. 
significant 
αjan only stat. 
significant 
S&P 500 465 (100%) 86 (18%) 74 (16%) 8 (2%) 4 (1%) 
Notes: Significance is given at 95% level of confidence. Not all the S&P 500 members have been tested 
due to the occurrence of different issues such as lack of data or errors in the Bloomberg library. Only 465 
shares compose the final sample. 
 
Once again, the methodology used is the same but in order to better 
understand how the statistics were computed, the procedure that was followed must 
be explained. Firstly, all the stocks were tested according to equation (1). As a result, 
18% of the sample reports significant alphas. The second step was to apply equation 
(2) regression in order to check whether those 86 stocks that produced positive 
significant results represent the effective presence of the Sell in May effect or are a 
consequence of the amplification of the January effect. The final outcome clearly 
defends the preponderance of the Sell in May effect and the low presence of the 
January effect.  
In addition, Figure 1 resumes the statistics relative to the significance of Sell 
in May effect through equation (1) in order to understand the relevance, if any, of the 
presence of the pattern described in the size deciles analysis. What it actually appears 
is that those results hold as they show a considerably greater concentration of positive 
and higher, even if not always significant at 95% level, t-stats in the upper part of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 1 
- Distribution of T-statistics relative to Alphas for the S&P 500 - 
 
The second index that has been tested is the FTSE 100. In the first part of this 
section, FTSE100 reported highly significant alphas, being that its undeniable 
relevance in the European panorama, allied to the fact that the famous adage that is 
being studied comes directly from United Kingdom made this choice even more 
intuitive. The procedure adopted is exactly the same as before and the results obtained 
are presented in Table 10 and Figure 2. 
 
                                     Table 10 
- Summary Results for the FTSE100 - 
Index Number of Stocks 
"Sell in May” 
effect 
α1 only stat. 
significant 
α1 + αjan stat. 
significant 
αjan only stat. 
significant 
FTSE 100 100 (100%) 14 (14%) 13 (13%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Notes: significance is given at 95% level of confidence    
 
Figure 2  
- Distribution of T-statistics relative to Alphas for the FTSE00 - 
Again, despite the fact that the FTSE 100 presents a very strong Sell in May 
effect, the percentage of positive results for the Sell in May effect for each stock is 
really low. Therefore, the effect seems to fade away when trying to verify it at a 
stock-to-stock level. However, when analysing Figure 2, apart from 
noticing the increased presence of high t-statistics, a closer look allows observing that 
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a consistent number of the stocks are on the edge between significance and the non-
significance. 
 
4.8. Robustness check 
To test if the period of Sell in May effect is correctly identified, a robustness 
analysis was performed to determine which period has higher significance and alpha. 
Recalling the definition of alpha as the average monthly return of the bullish period in 
excess of the average monthly return of the bearish period, one would want to have 
the higher alpha as possible. 7 of the most important financial markets in the world 
were chosen for this analysis. As a result, it is possible to conclude that the months 
between November and April are indeed the period, where the Sell in May puzzle is 
more noticed. Table 11 provides some results on the different values of αt, from 
Equation (1). 
Table 11 
αt for different periods of 6-months on Sample Country Indexes 
  S&P/TSX CAC40 DAX30 FTSEMIB NIKKEI225 FTSE100 S&P500 
November - April   1.19***   1.98*** 1.50*** 2.55** 1.53*** 1.23** 0.93** 
  [2.80] [2.83] [2.89] [2.53] [3.07] [2.53] [2.29] 
October-March 0.75 1.32* 1.16*** 2.25** 0.97* 0.74 0.69* 
  [1.52] [1.87] [2.22] [2.22] [1.94] [1.44] [1.70] 
December-May 1.12** 1.73*** 0.93* 2.13 1.53*** 1.55* 0.76* 
 [2.18] [2.67] [1.95] [1.57] [2.82] [1.90] [1.72] 
Note: The t-values for α1 are presented in brackets. *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% significant. 
 
Moreover, it is important to discriminate the period into smaller periods and 
analyse it separately to evidence which are the strongest months and understand if the 
period should actually be composed of this 6 months or not. The analysis will be 
performed with a quarterly division. In this case, the regression applied will differ, as 
now there is the need to add two dummy variables to explain all periods, meaning µμ 
will represent a quarter and the other 3 dummy variables the remaining ones. The new 
equation will be as follows: 
                                r! =   µμ+   α!S!" + α!S!" + α!S!" +   ε!                            (3) 
Once more, the conclusion is that the months between November and April 
are the ones that represent at maximum extent the Sell in May effect, meaning were 
α1 is higher and significantly different from zero. These conclusions are presented in 
Table 12. 
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Table 12 
Parameters values for Quarter analysis of sample Country Indexes 
  Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Nov-Jan Feb-Apr May-Jul Aug-Oct 
S&P/TSX 0.95** 0.02 -0.47 -1.10 2.02*** 1.29** 1.17* -0.56 
  [2.22] [0.03] [-0.77] [-1.83] [3.39] [2.16] [1.95] [-1.33] 
CAC40 0.84 0.76 -0.44 -1.32 1.72*** 2.42*** -0.06 -0.43 
  [1.51] [0.98] [-0.57] [-1.69] [2.22] [3.12] [-0.08] [-0.79] 
DAX30 1.22** -0.37 -0.82 -2.17*** 1.84*** 2.02*** 0.76 -0.77 
  [2.54] [-0.53] [-1.2] [-3.18] [2.70] [2.96] [1.11] [-1.6] 
FTSEMIB 0.40 2.17** -0.69 -0.88 2.55*** 2.32** -0.17 -0.62 
  [0.63] [2.41] [-0.76] [-0.98] [2.84] [2.58] [-0.19] [-0.98] 
NIKKEI225 0.08 0.80 0.48 -0.87 1.80*** 2.10*** 0.95 -1.03** 
  [0.16] [1.18] [0.71] [-1.29] [2.69] [3.13] [1.41] [-2.18] 
FTSE100 0.82 0.47 -0.38 -0.91 1.67** 1.74** -0.05 -0.22 
  [1.66] [0.68] [-0.54] [-1.29] [2.4] [2.51] [-0.07] [-0.45] 
S&P500 1.07** -0.49 -0.23 -1.46** 1.37** 0.91 0.60 -0.19 
 
[2.52] [-0.81] [-0.38] [-2.43] [2.29] [1.52] [1.00] [-0.46] 
Note: The t-values are presented in brackets. *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% significant. 
 
One can clearly understand that both quarters starting on November and 
February are positive and significant for all indexes considered, leading to the 
conclusion that the six months of November to April constitute indeed the period 
where Sell in May effect is most felt.  
 
 
5. Strategy on Sell in May effect 
“If you must play, decide on three things at the start: the rules of the game, the stakes and the 
quitting time.” 
Chinese Proverb 
 
When talking about academic research on anomalies, any sort of discovery is 
meaningless if not conducive to provide consistent returns. For this reason, the final 
step of this paper is focused on finding a strategy based on the Sell in May effect that 
is able to beat the benchmark. 
The approach is as follows: firstly, all the stocks from the S&P 500 that 
presented significant alphas in the final part of section 4 were collected. However, in 
order to have a time span that is wide enough for computing the strategy, only the 
ones that were exhibited at least 30 years of data were considered. Integrating this 
constraint, the final number of stocks is 49 which will compose an equal-weighted 
portfolio as it generally outperforms other sophisticated asset allocation models as 
argued by DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009). 
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Following this approach, two strategies are designed: “Buy & Hold” for all the 
period of estimation and another called Sell in May, where instead of keeping 
constantly the position throughout the year, the investor should divest from the market 
and go for the risk free asset – a 3-month US T-bill – during the bearish period of the 
markets (May-October) buying back all his position on the Halloween day4.  
Finally, the statistics are computed for simply holding the market portfolio 
(S&P500) and the excess returns of the portfolios – holding all the stocks throughout 
the year and Sell in May – are tested out-of-sample for the two different strategies, 
using the “rolling-sample”5 approach described in DeMiguel et al. (2009). Table 13 
summarizes the results, presenting annualized excess returns, standard deviation, 
Sharpe ratio and certainty equivalent6. 
 
 
Looking at Table 13, the results obtained are self-explanatory, as the returns of 
the Sell in May strategy are outperforming the market by a substantial margin with 
the important feature that, as expected by construction, given the investment in risk 
free during bearish times, the strategy provides lower standard deviation. Moreover, 
when considering Sharpe ratios, the only significant and positive is the Sell in May 
portfolio strategy exceeding around four times the other two. It is important to state 
that each Sharpe Ratio was adjusted due to high serial-correlation7 on the returns. In 
addition, the Certainty Equivalent is also the highest one, showing how remarkable 
this strategy can be for an investor. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For	  simplicity,	  any	  kind	  of	  transaction	  cost	  will	  not	  be	  initially	  taken	  into	  account.	  
5	  Initial	  estimation	  period	  of	  2	  years.	  Rolling	  rebound	  each	  month.	  
6	  Calculated	  through	  R	  –	  (γ/2)σ	  ,	  assuming	  γ	  =	  4	  
7	  Suggested	  on	  Lo,	  A.	  “The	  Statistics	  of	  Sharpe	  Ratio”.	  Financial	  Analysts	  Journal,	  58	  (2002),	  pp.36-­‐50	  
Table 13 
- Comparison between strategies Out-of-sample - 
Strategy Excess Returns Standard Dev Skewness Excess Kurtosis Sharpe Ratio Certainty Equivalent 
S&P 500 2.44 15.77% -0.90 3.09 0.15 2.51% 
 [0.87]    [0.84]  Buy &Hold 2.60% 20.46% -3.43 15.60 0.09 -5.77% 
 [0.70]    [0.51]  Sell in May 7.60%*** 11.85% 0.22 -1.55 0.39** 4.79% 
 [3.51]    [2.04]  Notes: All the statistics are annualized averages of monthly data. The values reported in brackets are t-stats. Sharpe Ratio 
is computed using U.S. 3 month T-bill and their respective t-values for both the period of November-April and May-
October are calculated as proposed by Lo (2002). *10% significant; **5% significant; ***1% significant. 
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Furthermore, skewness and kurtosis should be subject of discussion and 
comparison as well. Sell in May strategy once more seems to outperforms both other 
strategies as it can provide fatter right tails and returns with higher concentration 
around the mean, avoiding thus potential huge losses – which is not the case when we 
look to high positive excess kurtosis of both buy & hold strategy and the market. 
 
5.1. Incorporating transaction costs 
Although this strategy seems to clearly outperform both the market and a buy 
& hold strategy of the stocks portfolio, one should take into account the transaction 
costs associated with such strategy. A break-even analysis was performed in order to 
determine at what point, integrating transaction fees, the excess return of Sell in May 
strategy becomes inferior to the buy & hold strategy  
The analysis performed takes into consideration the monthly rebalancing that 
is necessary for the implementation of the equal-weighted portfolio. As a result, both 
strategies, Sell in May and buy & hold, have transaction costs, although one should 
anticipate an higher impact in the Sell in May strategy as the investor has the need to 
buy and sell all the portfolio each year. Besides, the approach taken is pretty 
straightforward. The adjustments on the weights, meaning buying or selling the 
specific stock, will be dependent on the stock’s return and how it impacts the stock’s 
weight to increase or decrease. The necessary adjustment would be the difference 
between this new weight and the fixed weight – 1 over N, so 2.04%. Thus, in Table 
14 are presented the corresponding costs, as a percentage of the initial investment, for 
each strategy consistent to different values of commissions to be charged over a single 
transaction. 
Table 14 
- Transaction Costs as a % of Initial Investment given a commission for a single transaction - 
  0.50% 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 2.50% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.00% 
“Sell in May” 1.11% 2.21% 3.32% 4.42% 5.53% 6.63% 7.74% 8.84% 9.95% 11.05% 
Buy & Hold 0.30% 0.59% 0.89% 1.18% 1.48% 1.77% 2.07% 2.36% 2.66% 2.95% 
 
The “Sell in May” Strategy clearly has higher cost to the investor than a buy & 
hold Strategy and its growth curve is significantly different.  
Additionally, in Figure 3, it is possible to observe the behaviour of the 
transaction costs on the Sell in May strategy, meaning that as transaction fees go 
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higher, higher would be the cost of the portfolio as a percentage of the initial 
investment.  
 
Figure 3  
- Equalization fee for “Sell in May” strategy - 
	  
The break-even point, where the gains from the strategy are completely wiped 
out due to transaction costs, is the intersection of both curves, which produces an 
approximately fee commission of 3,1%. Consequently, any fee commission charged 
to an investor that it is below this figure would allow him to profit by applying the 
Sell in May strategy. 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
“Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked” 
Warren Buffett 
 
Several centuries later, the ancient English adage “Sell in May and go away” 
still seems to affect the course of the equity markets and assumes itself as self-
fulfilling prophecy. Can the rationale for the effect only lie on the accumulation of 
different kinds of common events that occur during the November-April period, such 
as the end of the fiscal year, the so called January effect, payments of dividend or 
closing of the accounting year for most of the companies? It may be also related to 
volume or liquidity. Academics still do not find consensus and reasoning and that is 
why this effect still remains a puzzle. There is, in fact, empirical evidence of a bull 
market between November and April and a bear market, present between May and 
September. That was the main hypothesis this paper attempted to answer, and not to 
provide the absolute reasons why it is so.  
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Moreover, the evidence that higher and positive returns occur between 
November and April is strong, tested for any kind of robustness and persistent over 
time as 14 more years of data and different periods of market turmoil have been added 
since Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) documented the effect.  
The Sell in May effect has a higher preponderance in European countries, 
though being its presence is undeniable all over the world. Also, the deciles analysis 
of Russel3000 led to the conclusion that companies with relatively higher market 
capitalization are more affected. Moreover, when tested on single stocks, the Sell in 
May effect appears to slightly vanish. Additionally, the Sell in May effect is almost 
absent when confronted with higher dividend yield companies and there is no clear 
pattern when Price-Earnings ratio enters the equation.  
A simple strategy based on the Sell in May effect outperforms the benchmark 
providing interesting and rewarding results for an investor. This outperformance is 
possible with a strategy that is less risky than simply holding the market index, 
measured by standard deviation, skewness or kurtosis.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I – Detailed Presentation of Country Indexes  
Region Market Indexes Number of Observations Countries Bloomberg Ticker 
Asia-
Pacific 
S&P/ASX200 235 Australia AS51  
HK Hang Seng 503 Hong Kong HSI  
Jakarta SE 344 Indonesia JCI  
NIKKEI225 503 Japan NKY  
Korea SE 383 South Korea KOSPI  
FTSE Malaysia 216 Malaysia KLCIADV  
New Zealand SE 131 New Zealand NZSE50FG  
Philippines SE 299 Philippines PCOMP  
Singapore ST 148 Singapore FSSTI  
Taiwan SE 503 Taiwan TWSE  
Thailand SE 293 Thailand SET  
Europe 
Vienna SE 234 Austria WBI  
BEL20 252 Belgium BEL20  
OMX Copenhagen 192 Denmark KAX  
OMX Helsinki 25 283 Finland HEX25  
CAC40 293 France CAC  
DAX 503 Germany DAX  
Athens SE 299 Greece ASE  
Irish SE 347 Ireland ISEQ  
FTSEMIB 168 Italy FTSEMIB  
AEX 347 Netherlands   AEX  
Oslo SE OBX 191 Norway OBX  
PSI20 228 Portugal PSI20  
MICEX 171 Russia CF	   
IBEX 299 Spain IBEX  
OMX Stocholm 30 300 Sweden  OMX  
Swiss MI 281 Switzerland SMI  
Istanbul SE 100 287 Turkey XU100  
FTSE100 335 U.K. UKX  
Middle 
East & 
Africa 
Amman SE 144 Jordan JOSMGNFF  
FTSE/JSE Africa 198 South Africa JALSH  
North-
America 
S&P/TSX 503 Canada SPTSX  
S&P500 503 U.S.A. SPX  
Mexican SE 215 Mexico MEXBOL  
Latin 
America 
Buenos Aires SE 287 Argentina MERVAL  
BOVESPA 264 Brazil IBOV  
Santiago SE 263 Chile IGPA  
 
